# 1N Subs DA

### Notes

#### They have to ban it in the AC for this to work. China can mayyybbeee ban it too but that’s sticky.

#### Heg is good and solves the potential for all wars. Great solves the case argument.

#### The subs mentioned, the seawolf and Virginia, are nuclear subs. They run on smrs. The us hasn’t had a nonnuclear sub since the 50s. we lose basically all our subs in a world of the aff.

#### The worst part of the da is the nuclear subs specifically are key to fighting china in the south china sea. Very winnable though.

### 1N

#### Chinese South China Sea militarization coming now and competing for heg. BITZINGER 9/4:

\*Richard A. Bitzinger is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.Richard A. Bitzinger SEPTEMBER 4, 2016 “China’s Militarisation Of South China Sea: Creating A Strategic Strait? – Analysis.” http://www.eurasiareview.com/04092016-chinas-militarisation-of-south-china-sea-creating-a-strategic-strait-analysis/

China continues to up the ante in the South China Sea (SCS), by moving more military and paramilitary forces into the area. The apparent objective is to turn the [sea] SCS into a Chinese-controlled waterway and strategic chokepoint. It has become increasingly evident that China intends to make the South China Sea (SCS) a Chinese lake, subject to its “indisputable sovereignty”. However, the issue of Chinese hegemony in the SCS is less and less about economics – oil and gas reserves, or fishing rights – and increasingly about the militarisation of this body of water. The South China Sea is becoming a key defensive zone for China. This can be seen in a number of recent activities. The first of these is the ratcheting up of activities by China’s “militarised fisherman,” the so-called “little blue men” who go out in the SCS and clash with ships from other nations, both commercial and naval. These are not simply private fishermen engaged in “patriotic activities”. On the contrary, according to researchers at the US Naval War College (NWC), these vessels are in fact a maritime militia subsidised by Beijing and effectively a part-time military organisation.

#### US Nuclear-powered subs of Virginia and Seawolf Class are key to preventing that – china’s tech is increasing – we’re on the brink – otherwise they’ll take the region. MAJUMDAR 6/27:

Dave Majumdar is the Defense Editor of *The National Interest*. Dave Majumdar, June 27, 2016 “Why the US Navy Should Fear China's New 093B Nuclear Attack Submarine” *The National Interest*

Is China’s new Type 093B nuclear-powered attack submarine on par with the U.S. Navy’s Improved Los Angeles-class boats? At least some U.S. naval analysts believe so and contend that the introduction of the new People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines is an indication of just how quickly Beijing is catching up to the West. “The 93B is not to be confused with the 93. It is a transition platform between the 93 and the forthcoming 95,” said Jerry Hendrix, director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at the Center for a New American Security—who is also a former U.S. Navy Captain. “It is quieter and it has a new assortment of weapons to include cruise missiles and a vertical launch capability. The 93B is analogous to our LA improved in quietness and their appearance demonstrates that China is learning quickly about how to build a modern fast attack boat.” Other sources were not convinced that Beijing could have made such enormous technological strides so quickly—but they noted that the topic of Chinese undersea warfare capability is very classified. Open source analysis is often extremely difficult, if not impossible. “Regarding the question on the Type 093B, I really don’t know, anything is possible I suppose, but I doubt it,” said retired Rear Adm. Mike McDevitt, now an analyst at CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses. “I have no doubt that the PLAN has ambitions to at least achieve that level of capability and quietness.” Though the Seawolf and Virginia-classes have surpassed the Improved Los Angeles-class as the premier U.S. Navy attack submarines, such older vessels will remain the mainstay of the service’s undersea fleet for many years to come. If the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s newest boats are able to match the capabilities of the U.S. Navy’s shrinking undersea fleet, Washington could be in serious trouble. Indeed, the U.S. Navy already anticipated that it could be facing-off against a Chinese submarine fleet that is nearly twice its size, but not as technically capable. The U.S. Navy—which has roughly 52 attack submarines—is on track to have 41 attack boats by 2029. The Chinese, meanwhile would have “at least 70, and they’re building,” Vice Adm. Joseph Mulloy, the service’s deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources told the House Armed Services Committee’s seapower and projection forces subcommittee on February 25. “You get back into the whole quality versus quantity issue, but at the same time the Russians are also building...and they build much higher-end submarines.” In a 2016 report to Congress, the Pentagon noted that Beijing continues to upgrade and expand its submarine fleet: “China continues to improve its SSN force, and four additional SHANG-class SSN (Type 093) will eventually join the two already in service. The SHANG SSN will replace the aging HAN class SSN (Type 091). These improved SHANG SSNs feature a vertical launch system (VLS) and may be able to fire the YJ-18 advanced anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). Over the next decade, China may construct a new Type 095 nuclear-powered, guided missile attack submarine (SSGN), which not only would improve the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability but might also provide it with a more clandestine land-attack option.” The problem, however, is if Hendrix’s assessment is correct and future Chinese submarines are only slightly less capable than the Virginia or Seawolf-class vessels, the Navy could be in trouble. The technological edge the U.S. Navy—which is already woefully short on attack boats—is counting on might not be sufficient to counter Chinese numerical superiority. However, the service is continuing to improve the performance capabilities of its submarines on a continual basis. Nonetheless, one former U.S. Navy undersea warfare officer suggested that the service would come to regret having truncated the high-performance submarine-hunting Seawolf-class at three boats and focusing instead on the more multi-role Virginia-class. Aware of the coming attack boat shortfall, the U.S. Navy is hoping to boost its attack submarine fleet by continuing to build two Virginia-class vessels per year even while it builds the next-generation Ohio Replacement Program ballistic missile submarine. However, if the Chinese are truly catching up technologically, Congress might consider accelerating the attack submarine build rate to the maximum capacity of America’s two nuclear-capable shipyards. At the same time, the U.S. Navy might have to accelerate the development of the next-generation successor to the Virginia-class, which has been tentatively designated the SSN(X) program and is scheduled to enter service in 2044.

#### Tanks heg. MIZOKAMI 6/1

Mizokami 6/1 Kyle Mizokami writes on defense and security issues in Asia, particularly Japan. He is the founder and editor for the blogs Japan Security Watch and Asia Security Watch. Contributor at The Daily Beast, The Atlantic.com, Salon, The Japan Times and The Diplomat; “This is the real reason China is deploying its nuclear subs,” June 1 2016, The Week

Last week, The Guardian announced that **China was preparing to send its nuclear missile-armed submarines into**¶ **the South China Sea**. China's excuse — that it is merely countering American moves in neighboring South Korea — is a flimsy one, intended to paint China as the victim. In¶ reality, China has planned this move for decades. **The People's Republic of China is in the midst of a territorial grab** that has¶ placed itself on one side and virtually all of its neighbors — and the United States — on the other. **At stake is freedom of navigation** in one of the busiest¶ waterways in the world, **and China's plans for fighting a nuclear war**. Lying off the coast of Southeast Asia, **the South China**¶ **Sea is one of the most strategic and economically vital stretches of water** in the world**.** A third of the¶ world's merchant traffic passes through the area. It's also **packed with** resources**,** includingrich **fishing grounds and** large¶ **reserves of oil** and natural gas.The South China Sea functions as a sea border for a number of countries, including China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei,¶ Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. In recent years, **China has laid claim to roughly 90 percent of the South China Sea,**¶ **trampling competing claims** by her neighbors. China has used dredging to turn several shoals, reefs, and¶ islets into bustling military outposts. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States split their nuclear weapons between long-range¶ missiles, bombers, and missile-firing submarines. Diversifying ensured that it would be difficult to destroy a country's nuclear stockpile in a single, surprise attack. **The United**¶ **States, with a powerful navy** and technological **edge, was less restrictive on where it could**¶ **send its submarines**. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had inferior submarines, shorter-range missiles, and a less capable navy. In order to protect their missile submarines, the Soviets established two "bastions" — one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific — adjacent to their territory where they could be better protected. As a rising power, China is¶ roughly charting the same course the Americans and Soviets did 50 years ago. **China has land-based missiles, bombers, and missile submarines.** And **China is establishing its own bastion — in the South China Sea**. This sea grab is a logical¶ response to China's strategic dilemma. China's coming submarine deployment is allegedly in response to the deployment of the American THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea. While it is¶ true that the U.S. is deploying THAAD on the Korean peninsula, the system can only be used against missiles targeting South Korea — coming from China's ally, North Korea. China's¶ explanation is designed to make Beijing look like the victim.But **China**, which has its main submarine missile base adjacent to the South China Sea,¶ **has been preparing to sail its** missile **submarines** there for **years.** China's aggression in the South China Sea is not likely merely for aggression's sake, or the result of a rising power feeling its oats. China is acting out of strategic necessity, something even more dangerous because it feels it is doing something¶ because it must, not simply because it can. The ruling **Chinese Communist Party has made the calculation that the strategic benefits**¶ — **having a safe location for its nuclear missile submarines — outweighs the negative attention**¶ the country is receiving worldwide. What does that mean? It means that Beijing is not going to back down. Chinese nuclear weapons, which are the ultimate¶ guarantor of Communist Party rule, areinvolved, and anything crucial to the survival of the regime is non-negotiable. Barring a new nuclear¶ strategy — perhaps one that rules out submarines and relies on land-based missiles hidden in tunnels — **controlling the sea is a must.** Beijing has access to other stretches of the Pacific, but they can be easily accessed by traditional rivals including Taiwan and Japan. The South China Sea, for example, is adjacent to a number of relatively poor,¶ weak states. At the same time**, the United States and its regional allies are lining up to contest** China's sea grab. At stake for¶ the allies is having **an expansive China on their doorstep and the loss of freedom of navigation** in an essential¶ waterway. From Washington's point of view, **losing control of the South China Sea would be a blow to its credibility**¶ **as a superpower**. Better to push back against Beijing now, while the country is comparatively weak and before China's neighbors become resigned to the new reality. Would it be better to informally cede control of the South China Sea to China, much the way the U.S. has de facto control over the Gulf of Mexico? Unfortunately, no. American control of the Gulf of¶ Mexico doesn't come at the expense of other nations, while China is running roughshod over its neighbors. Also, while China may be acting out of necessity now, American weakness could embolden China to make strictly elective territorial grabs in the future. There is no easy way to placate China. Facing off in the South China Sea are two sides, both doing what they think they must. It's a dangerous combination, with no room for negotiation or backing down. Expect to hear much more about this faraway stretch of ocean for years to come.

#### Extinction. BLAGDEN ’15:

Blagden 15 (David, phD at the University of Oxford, the Adrian Research Fellow in International Politics at Darwin College, and a Research Associate with the Centre for Rising Powers in the Department of Politics and International Studies, both at the University of Cambridge, “Global multipolarity, European security and implications for UK grand strategy: back to the future, once again” International Affairs 91: 2, 2015, pg 340-342)

Third, **a multipolar world of** elevated Great Power security **competition is likely to be one with considerable potential for military crises**, which could embroil European states—either inadvertently, or because their vital interests are affected. Whereas under unipolarity, **the United States could pacify** all **potential major power conflicts by threatening to defeat** one or—if necessary—**both sides, that is no longer the case under multipolarity**. Indeed, the difficulty in predicting future international conflict suggests that European grand strategy should at least partially hedge against embroilment in such as yet unforeseen emergencies. **There is considerable potential for military crises on the borders of NATO,** as the events of 2008 and 2014 demonstrate, and any such crisis on Europe’s borders will be a pressing security concern for European states. Likewise, the Middle East is likely to remain a focal point of security competition and an arena of potential conflict embroiling European states, given its proximity to the European periphery, its economic importance to Europe, China and India, continuing civil wars in Syria and Iraq, the strength of regional revolutionary movements such as Islamic State/ ISIS, and the presence of several militarily capable regional powers with divergent interests, such as Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Egypt. **There is also the risk of involvement in military crises further afield, particularly where key commercial or strategic interests are at stake**. For example, threats to UK interests in the South Atlantic will increase as Latin American development proceeds, especially if the seabed around the Falkland Islands contains large-scale mineral deposits, and France could face similar challenges in Africa. Of course, this article cannot hope, and does not aim, to laundry-list all potential future conflict scenarios; **the key point is that in a world of general Great Power tension, the likelihood of serious militarized crises will increase**. The fourth reason why **a multipolar global environment may have an impact on the European strategic environment is that itmay increase incentives to acquire nuclear weapons—or at least, not to give them up.** There are excellent reasons to suppose that nuclear weapons favour defence and make interstate conflict between possessors less likely.41 However, the **likelihood of accidental**, inadvertent or miscalculated **nuclear use rises with the number of nuclear powers, particularly when that number includes states with weak administrative capacity and political systems with the potential to be dominated by non-representative militarist or radical factions**.42 Multipolar Great Power competition will make many states feel vulnerable, and the best deterrent against coercion by those strong in conventional weapons is a nuclear arsenal. Likewise, in such a world, states are more likely to feel that they require a potent means of coercion to promote their interests. That being the case, a grand multilateral disarmament bargain is unlikely, and non-proliferation efforts may well continue to struggle in the coming years, with potentially negative consequences for the European security environment. Of course, it can be argued that there has been less nuclear proliferation than many analysts predicted in the 1950s and 1960s. Conversely, however, Ukraine has recently joined a list of countries, including Libya and Iraq, whose leaders presumably regretted surrendering the deterrent power of a weapons of mass destruction programme under the urgings of the major power(s) that subsequently attacked them. If America’s ability to pacify the globe does wane, moreover, plenty of nuclear-capable states under the US nuclear umbrella that currently choose not to develop nuclear weapons will feel compelled to revisit that choice (South Korea and Japan being obvious candidates). The fifth and final reason why a multipolar international system could threaten the European strategic environment connects to the point made above about potential embroilment in military crises elsewhere in the world. This is the potential for such crises to have negative impacts upon European states’ SLOCsand associated critical supply chains (for food, raw materials, energy, industrial inputs and so forth). Europe relies on uninterrupted flows of imports and exports, mainly via the sea, for economic well-being and strategic viability. European energy supplies rely heavily on the Middle East and Russia—both potential sources of diplomatic and strategic tension. The Indian Ocean, the Persian and Arabian Gulfs, and the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, meanwhile, are all crucial to European seagoingcommerce **as well as potential arenas of maritime Great Power contestation**. Yet European states’ maritime capability to provide independent (non-US) influence over such SLOCs has been hollowed outby progressive waves of naval cuts. Meanwhile, the South Atlantic will remain an important theatre for the United Kingdom while London sustains its current resolve to retain possession of the Falklands, and all west European states should consider Russia’s increasing maritime assertiveness in the north-east Atlantic—the single most crucial SLOC for European powers, both commercially and strategically

# 2N Extensions/Extras:

Whoopdy fuckin’ doo there’s nothing